15 February 2023

No one questions the fact that technology has colonized various aspects of our lives. We make use of technology in our work in a great variety of professional fields, in establishing our social relationships or in order to look for on-the-spot information. This new digital world generates different reactions, which del range from pessimism arising from the risks provoked by a certain confusion, perplexity and, at times moral blockage, to an optimistic outlook based on the possibilities the digital world offers for human development. This article is centred at the intersection of these two viewpoints and aims to examine whether the digital world demands a new paradigm of virtues — a substantial change — or whether it simply requires an updating of the classical pattern of virtues to the new circumstances produced by technological change. The article will set out some of the principal characteristics which are provoked by the almost total presence of technology in our lives and will focus on the virtue of critical thinking, which has become especially necessary in view of problems of infoxication, post-truth or the more and more common methods of online fraud and abuse. After analysing these aspects and the limits of technology and of the digital paradigm, we argue that in the present-day context there are no elements which are incompatible with the classical conception of the virtues. It is certainly true that new challenges will emerge in character education in view of students’ immersion in the use of IT and that this situation will mean that certain virtues will require special reappraisal; such will be the case of critical thought, responsibility and the protection of privacy. However, there is no reason to suppose that the pillars of Aristotelian ethics have been in any way altered or have become obsolete. We defend the idea that an updating and adjustment to a demanding new context is preferable to any really substantial change, since the foundation and objectives of the ethics of virtue remain unchanged in the digital world.

Please, cite this article as follows: Fuentes, J. L., & Valero, J. (2023). Nuevas virtudes digitales o virtudes para el contexto digital: ¿es necesaria una nueva educación del carácter? | New digital virtues or virtues for the digital context. Do we need a new model of character education? Revista Española de Pedagogía, 81 (284), 123-141.

15 February 2023

This paper presents a systematic review of scientific articles on friendship and character education (CE) published between 2007 and 2021. It seeks to identify the dominant theo- ries from which CE is approached, how friend- ship is understood in the studies, and what specific relationship is built between friend- ship and character; in other words, the extent to which it is posited that friendship can be harnessed to acquire virtues. Results indicate a prevalence of a psychological approach to CE, linked to an instrumentalist perspective on friendship, which associates it with certain benefits. However, this approach is closely followed by a philosophical–moral view that understands friendship as a good in itself and, consequently, highlights its humanizing potential. The Aristotelian framework for un- derstanding friendship and character stands out within this approach. The relationship be- tween friendship and character in the selected articles is explored through 5 categories that emerged in the analysis: 1) friendship for char- acter; 2) character for friendship; 3) friendship and transgressions; 4) teachers’ and students’ perceptions of the influence of friendship; and 5) analysis of programmes that include friendship in the curriculum.

Please, cite this article as follows: Espinosa Zárate, Z., Ahedo Ruiz, J., & Rumayor, M. (2023). Amistad y educación del carácter: una revisión sistemática | Friendship and character education: A systematic review. Revista Española de Pedagogía, 81 (284), 143-169.